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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF CLAUDIUS W ALLICH, 
Deceased. 
FRED R. W ALLICH, 
Claimant and Appellant, 
A. C. W ALLICH, 
Claimant and Respondent. 
No. 9144 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Claudius Wallich died on May 23, 1958 within 
and a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Decedent left a Last Will and Testament and three 
Codicils thereto, all of which were admitted to pro-
bate in the District Court of Salt Lake Caunty. Under 
decedent's Last Will and Testament dated October 
11, 1950 and Codicil thereto dated April 10, 1952, 
which is identical with Paragraph 7 of the Last Will 
with the exception of the naming of Fred R. W allich 
as an additional Trustee, said Paragraph 7 as so 
amended in the Codicil provides as follows: 
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"7. I hereby give, devise and bequeath ~y 
vacant lot located on Grixdale Avenue in Detro1t, 
Michigan, to A. C. Wallich, said son of my deceased 
brother, Charles J. Wallich, to be his own separate 
property. I further hereby give, devise and bequeath 
to the said A. C. Wallich and the said Fred R. Wal-
lich, the property owned by me located at No. 9721 
Petosky, Detroit, Michigan, and an additional sum 
of $10,000.00 cash, to be held by them in trust, never-
theless, for the use and benefit of my sister, Wilhel-
mina W allich, they to use and dispose of said prop-
erty and money in such manner as they may jointly 
determine, for the use, benefit, comfort and well be-
ing of m said sister, Wilhelmina Wallich during her 
lifetime, and upon her death, if any part of said 
monies or if said property still remains in the trust, 
then the said A. C. Wallich shall have such re-
mainder of said property held in trust as aforesaid, 
as his sole separate property, free of the trust here-
in imposed. The said A. C. Wallich and Fred R. 
Wallich shall act as Trustees hereunder without the 
necessity of furnishing any bond and without the 
necessity of accounting to any Court or any person 
or party concerning their administration of the trust 
herein imposed upon them." 
Wilhelmina Wallich predeceased the testator, 
dying on April 26, 1956. On February 5, 1959 the 
Executor filed its first and Final Account and Peti-
tion for distribution, which Petition was set for hear-
ing on the 18th day of February, 1959, at which time 
A. C. W allich appeared by counsel and objected to 
the granting of said ePtition upon the ground that 
it failed to recognize the provisions of paragraph 
7 of the Will as amended by the Codicil as above 
set out. The said Petition treated the $10,000.00 be-
quest as having lapsed (7-22.) On February 18~ 
1959 the Executor and A. C. Wallich through his 
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3 
counsel entered into a stipulation providing for the 
retention of the sum of $15,000.00 cash by the Ex-
ecutor and authorizing the distribution of the re-
mainder of the estate pursuant to the Petition of 
the Executor, said $15,000.00 to be held by the Ex-
ecutor pending the determination by the Court of 
the right of A. C. W allich to receive the same pur-
suant to paragraph 7 of said Last Will as amended, 
(R-49). Pursuant to said Stipulation and said Peti-
tion, the Court on February 24, 1959 distributed 
all of the assets of said estate, except said sum of 
$15,000.00 cash, to the beneficiaries under said Will. 
That the property on hand with said Executor at the 
time of said distribution had a market value of 
$27L270.89, (R-43). That there were distributed to 
Fred R. W allich as Trustee of the residuary estate 
assets of the value of about $150,000.00, (R-95). The 
objection of A. C. Wallich was referred to the trial 
Court. for determination. A pretrial was held on 
the 5th day·~£ Jurie, 1'959 before Jtid'ge M~rrill C. 
Faux. Thereafter the matter came on regularly for 
trial before the Hon. Ray Von Cott Jr. on the 13th 
day of July, 1959. That on the 3rd day of Septem-
ber, 1959 the Hon. Ray VanCott Jr. made and en-
tered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment upholding the objection of A. C. W allich 
and direct~n'*,4b.f3 ~:;::X:~\!tor.:ottP:e~estaJe of Claudius 
W allich, deceased,. to· pay to A. c~ W ailich. the· sum 
of $10,000.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of 6 
per cent per annum from February 24, 1959 until 
paid. 
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On October 1, 1959 Fred R. Wallich filed his 
Notice of Appeal and Statements of Points. The 
Executor has not appealed. 
RESPONDENT'S POINTS 
POINT I: DEATH OF LIFE TENANT WILHEL-
MINA PRIOR TO DEATH OF TESTA-
TOR, CLAUDIUS W ALLICH RESULT-
ED IN THE VESTING OF THE RE-
MAINDER INTEREST IN A. C. W AL-
LICH AS OF THE DEATH OF THE 
TESTATOR. 
POINT II: TESTATOR IS PRESUMED TO HAVE 
INCORPORATED IN HIS WILL AND 
CODICILS THE PROVISIONS OF 
7 4-2-28 U.C.A. 1953. 
POINT III: TESTATOR'S INTENTION MUST BE 
DETERMINED FROM THE WILL. 
·~-'-. ... • . ...... !iiiAD • __ , . . yt~,·r, . · : .. • t!,__ ___ .:..nrr:r.:;;, _1_~-"' . . 1 
""· t - ~ · . POINr' I ~ , -· .at 
~ ._ -· --· -
DEATH OF LIFE TENANT \(ILHEU,-IINA PRIOR 
TO DEATH OF TESTATOR, CLAUDIUS WALLICH, 
RESULTED IN THE VESTING OF THE REMAINDER 
INTEREST IN A. C. \iALLICH AS OF THE 
DEATH OF THE TESTATOR. 
Ja ...,..time. he· ma.de.~).__w ill an<dn1tte Codicils 
ther~' ~audiiis ·vl a1lich --was-a. resident Of the State 
of Utah, his Will was executed in the State of Utah, 
and so far as said paragraph 7 is concerned, dis-
posed of personal property in the State of Utah and 
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he died within and a resident of the State of Utah, 
therefore the laws of the State of Utah govern. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
"74-2-28 INTERESTS IN REMAINDER NOT 
AFFECTED-The death of a devisee or legatee of 
a limited interest before the testator's death does 
not defeat the interest of persons in remainder who 
survive the testator." 
While our Supreme Court has not construed this 
section of the tSatute, this section of the Statute was 
adopted by Utah from the California Probate Code 
and is verbatum with Section 140 thereof. 
Section 140 has been construed by the Califor-
nia Court in the following cases. 
In Re: Lawrence Estate 
108 p 2d 893 
Supreme Court (California) 1941 
In this case the testator directed that the remain-
der of his estate be all used to purchase a refund 
type annuity in favor of his friend Black. The tes-
tator further provided that in the event of the death 
of Black any unused payments of annuities were to 
go to a charity. Black predeceased the testator and 
no annuity was purchased. The trial court upheld 
the contention of the heirs that the bequest to Black 
had lasped because he predeceased the testator 
and that said remainder over to the two charities 
was contingent and that said remainder over was 
destroyed by failure of the intervening life estate. 
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The lower court was reversed and the excerpts 
of the opinion reversing the lower court and apply-
ing section 140 of the Probate Code which was and 
is identical with 74-2-28 U.C.A. 1953 and the same 
as the early Section 1344 of the California Civil 
Code. 
IN RE: LAWRENCE ESTATE 108 P 2nd 893 
CALIFORNIA 1941. 
"The heirs in the case contend that it is obvious 
that the primary thought of the testator herein was 
to provide for his friend Black; that the provision as 
to the charities was secondary and subordinate there-
to; and that said provision naming the charities 
was only a contingent remainder, based on the fol-
lowing contingencies: (1) That Black survive the 
testator; (2) that a refund type of annuity be 
purchased; and (3) that there be a remainder of 
such principal from this specific annuity left upon 
the death of Black. They further contend that the 
testator did not intend the charities to have his en-
tire estate, but only the unspent remnant remaining 
at the end of the life of Black, which under the 
normal life expectancy of Black would be nothing. 
Examining the will before us, we are of the 
opinion that the general intent of the testator, as 
expressed therein, was to provide for Black during 
his life, and that thereafter any of the estate re-
maining was to go to the two named charities. 0 0 0 " 
"In our opinion none of the three contingencies 
set forth by the heirs must occur in order to permit 
the vesting of the interest of the charities. It is 
provided in Probate Code, section 140, that: "The 
death o.f a devisee or legatee of a limited interest be-
fore the testator's death does not defeat the interest 
of persons in remainder who survive the testator." 
Therefore the fact that Black, the legatee of the 
limited interest, predeceased the testator does not 
defeat the interest of the charities. 
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Another California case cited with approval and 
discussed in the Lawrence case is the following 
case: 
In RE: Gregory Estate 
108 p 566 
In this case the testator gave all of the rest, resi-
rue and remainder of the estate in trust to Olive 
Blanchard for the use and benefit of the wife of 
the testator with payments of $30.00 per month and 
with the further provision of paying any remainder 
to a granddaughter and grandson. The Court in 
this case held that despite the fact that the wife 
died prior to the testator and that no trust fund was 
set up as made and provided under 1344 which is 
identical to our 74-2-28 that there was no lapse and 
that the estate vested in the granddaughter and 
grandson upon the death of the testator. 
We call the court's attention to the language 
appearing in the court's opinion in the Lawrence 
case at Page 897 P 2d paragraphs 12 and 13, where-
in the Gregory case is fully discussed. 
The California Supreme Court, In Re McCurdy's 
Estate, 240 Pac. 498 (Cal. 1925), held that a remain-
der interest under a testamentary trust vested at the 
date of the death of the testator where the life tenant 
predeceased the testator. Under the trust consid-
ered the trustee had the right to invade corpus for 
the support and maintenance of the life tenant and, 
in addition, the life tenant had a general power of 
appointment over the corpus of the trust 
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The McCurdy's case is also referred to in the 
Lawrence case at Page 896 of 108 P 2d. 
Even in the absence of a status such as ours, 
under similar facts the courts under the common law 
have ruled that there is no lapse where the life 
tenant dies before the remainderman. One of the 
leading early cases that has been cited in many 
subsequent cases, particularly with respect to de-
fining the distinction between a condition prece-
dent and a condition subsequent, is the case of 
Parker vs. Parker, 123 Mass. 584. 
In a brief presented in the lower court all of the 
cases cited support the contention of Respondent 
and no cases were cited by the opposition to the 
contrary. Among some of the leading cases under 
identical facts cited to the lower court which uphold 
the Respondent's position and the trial court's de-
cision are the following: Hoss vs. Hoss, 39 NE 255 
Ind.; Gingrich et al. v. Gingrich, 45 NE 101 Indiana; 
Thompson v. Thornton, 83 NE (Mass.) 880; Jackson 
v. Knapp, 130 NE 524 Ill.; Hite et al. v. Hook, 96 
NE 2d 23 Ohio; Restatement, Property, Parts 1 and 
2, 230; Burnett v. McHaney, 148 SW (2d) 324 Mo. 
1940); Taylor v. Wendel, 4 Brad£ 324 (N.Y., 1857); 
Prescott v. Prescott, 7 Met 141 (Mass. 1843); Goodson 
v. Goldsmith, 131 Tex. 418, 115 SW (2d) 1100; Ford-
ham's Will, 235 NY 384, 139 NE 548; United States 
Trust Company of New York v. Hogencamp, 191 
NY 281, 84 NE 74; Price v. Talkington, 27 SE 2d 705 
W. Va. 1943; life tenant with right to dispose of 
property and power to appoint any remainderman; 
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Hite v. Hook, 96 NE 2d 23 (Ohio 1949); Clark v. Mack, 
126 NW 632 (Mich. 1910); Nelson v. Meade, 149 Atl. 
626 (Me. 1930) and Am. Jur., Wills, 1432, P. 960. See 
annotation in 3 ALR 2d 1419 and 133 ALR 1367. 
POINT II 
TESTATOR IS PRESUMED TO HAVE IN-
CORPORATED IN HIS WILL AND CODI-
CILS THE PROVISIONS OF 74-2-28 U.C.A. 
1953. 
The will in question having been made in Utah 
by a Utah resident, and disposing of personal prop-
erty in Utah, and is being probated in Utah, is 
governed by the Utah Statute and under the au-
thorities testator is presumed to have intended the 
Statute to apply. The cases also hold that testator 
is presumed to have known of the antilapse Statute 
and its effect on the bequest. The Court's attention 
is invited to the fact that there was no competent 
evidence before the court of any kind to rebut this 
presumption. The Court's attention is invited to 
the following: 
96 C.J.S. 1057 
In accordance with the rule stated in Evidence 
S 132 that all persons are presumed to know the 
law, the will must be presumed to have been made 
with knowledge by the testator of the existence of 
the statute and its effect in preventing the legacy 
from lapsing; and, unless an intent to the contrary 
is shown, the court must read the statute into the 
will, since it is presumed that the testator intended 
the statute to apply. 0 0 0 
See note 77 to above quotation, citing cases. 
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IN RE: EVERETT'S ESTATE 
28 N. W. 2d 21 (Iowa) 
"Testatrix is presumed to have known of the anti-
lapse statute and its effect on the bequest to her 
husband in the event he predeceased her. Mason v. 
Mason, 194 Iowa 504, 511, 188 N.W. 685; In re Es-
tate of Schroeder, supra; 69 C.J. 1061, section 2279. 
If testatrix did not intend section 633.16 to apply, 
:;he could easily have made the bequest to her hus-
band conditional upon his survival of her. In re 
Estate of Davis 204 Iowa 1231, 1235, 213 N.W. 395, 
396; in re Estate of Schroeder, supra; Longerbeam 
v. Iser, 159 Md. 244, 150 A. 793, 794. The effect of 
a reversal would be to write such condition into her 
will. o o o " 
POINT III 
TESTATOR'S INTENTION MUST BE DETERMINED 
FROM THE WILL 
Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
"74-2-2. INTENTION TO BE ASCERTAINED 
FROM WORDS OF WILL.-In case of uncertainty 
arising upon the face of a will as to the application 
of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is 
to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking 
into view the circumstances under which it was 
made, exclusive of his oral declarations." 
See ALR 94, Pages 26 to and including Page 293. 
This point is so well covered and so thoroughly 
annotated, particularly the issue of Latent and Pat-
ent Ambiguities and Extrinsic, we feel it is only 
necessary to invite the Court's attention to the anno-
tation appearing in 94 ALR at Pages 36 and includ-
ing 293. 
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REPLY TO APPELANT'S BRIEF 
The finding and conclusions are sufficient to 
support the judgment as noted on Page 1 of this 
Brief. Paragraph 7 of the Will provide: 
"
0 0 0
, then the said A. C. Wallich shall have such 
remainder of said property held in trust as afore-
said, as his sole separate property, free of the trust 
herein imposed." (Emphasis supplied) 
In the Lawrence case decided by the California 
Supreme Court hereinbefore cited there was a re-
quirement that the Executor use the entire estate 
after payment of debts and costs of administration 
to purchase a refunding annuity for Black, the life 
tenant. The court held it was not necessary that 
this annuity come into existence despite the fact 
that the provisions of the will provided that the re-
fund therefrom should go to the remainderman. 
The court held that the entire residue of the testa-
tor's estate vested in the remainderman absolutely 
upon the death of the testator. Moreover, in re: 
Gregor's estate cited above Olive Blanchard was 
to receive the property in trust and she was to pay, 
after the death of the life tenant, the residue to the 
granddaughter and grandson of the testatrix. The 
trust never came into existence, yet the court held 
that the entire fund vested in the granddaughter 
and grandson of the testatrix, upon the death of the 
testratrix. 
Thompson v. Thornton 83 NE 880 is another case 
where there were provisions with respect to a trust 
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and were also the precise words "if any thereof be 
left" were used, yet the court held although the life 
tenant died prior to the testator that the property 
immediately vested in the remainderman upon the 
death of the testator. Others of the cases cited above 
also use the precise words "if any thereof be left" 
particularly Hite et al. v. Hook 96 NE 2d 23. 
Also in the case of Hoss v. Hoss, 39 NE 255, the 
provisions of the will contained the following: 
"These bequests are made upon the condition that 
said E. J. Hoss will agree with my executor to do 
this." Here the court held that despite the fact that 
it appeared there was such a condition that never-
theless where performance was by an act of God 
rendered impossible, performance was then ex-
cused and title immediately vested upon the death 
of the testator. Counsel for the Appellant heard 
all these cases cited and discussed in the trial court 
and were requested to cite any cases to the con-
trary. No cases to the contrary were cited or called 
to the trial court's attention and none have been 
included in Appellant's Brief on appeal, all cases 
being unanimous in holding immediate vesting 
without the necessity of the trust coming into ex· 
istence. 
Counsel attempted to draw some inference from 
the fact that said Fred W allich was named as a co-
trustee with A. C. W allich by decedent's Codicil 
dated April 10, 1952 modifying Paragraph 7 of the 
Will. The only inference that could be appropriate-
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ly or reasonably drawn from such amendment is 
that the testator was mindful of the fact that A. C. 
W allich was to receive anything that was left after 
the death of Wilhelmina and the testator was most 
anxious to see that A. C. W allich would not be too 
conservative with the $10,000.00 and therefore ap-
pointed Fred W allich as co-trustee to make sure 
that the $10,000.00 would be used as the needs re-
quired rather than having A. C. W allich conserving 
it, knowing that all of the remainder would be his 
after the death of Wilhelmina. 
Moreover, we invite the Court's attention to the 
fact that the testator Claudius W allich is presumed 
to have intended that title and ownership of all the 
property mentioned in Paragraph 7 would vest in 
A. C. W allich upon the death of said testator should 
Wilhelmina predecease him. In support of this con-
tention we again call the Court's attention to Point 
II of Respondent's Brief and the authorities therein 
cited. 
Again improper inferences have been attempted 
by Appellant's counsel in their Brief with respect 
to the fact that the title to the Petosky property was 
conveyed by Claudius Wallich during his lifetime 
to A. C. W allich. The record, Exhibit 2, shows that 
the deed to the Petosky property was executed on 
the 18th day of August, 1953. Thereafter under 
date of January 7, 1954 the testator, Claudius Wallich 
executed a third Codicil which has been duly ad-
mitted to probate and which Codicil made no 
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change in said Paragraph 7, but contained the fol-
lowing provision: 
"In all other respects I hereby approve and con-
firm the provisions of my said Will and of my said 
two Codicils thereto, my said Will and Codicils 
being modified and changed only as herein in this 
Third Codicil provided." 
As previously stated in our Brief, by using the 
above language Claudius is presumed to have in-
tended that the provisions of Paragraph 7 should 
by reason of the Utah statute cause the immediate 
vesting of the property described therein in A. C. 
W allich upon the death of Claudius W allich should 
Wilhelmina predecease Claudius W allich. 
Moreover Claudius W allich after having deeded 
the property and knowing that A. C. W allich had 
sold the same, still made no change in his Will 
except to confirm and republish Paragraph 7. See 
third Codicil dated January 7, 1954. In addition to 
the presumption that exists under the lq.w it was ob-
vious that the testator accelerated his aid to Wilhel-
mina during his lifetime by deeding the Petosky 
property to A. C. W allich. The only inference that 
could be drawn from Exhibit 3 is that A. C. Wallich 
voluntarily made a gift to Aunt Kate of the remain· 
der of the proceeds of the sale of the Petosky prop-
erty. 
The Court's attention is also invited to the fact 
that in clear and concise language the testator in-
dicated a desire to provide for the care of Wilhel-
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mina during her lifetime with the property set out 
in Paragraph 7 and should she not live to enjoy 
it, A. C. W allich should have the same. Should 
Appellant's contention prevail, the result would be 
that the residuary estate would be enlarged from 
$150,000.00 to $160,000.00 A. C. Wallich would be 
deprived of property the testator expressly indi-
cated and intended that A. C. W allich should have 
and enjoy. We concur with Appellant in the cita-
tion of 7 4-2-2 which provides that the intention is 
to ascertained from the words of the Will and also 
with respect to 74-2-1 that the testator's intention 
governs. 
We invite the Court's attention to the fact that 
nowhere in Appellant's Brief are any facts stated 
or referred to which were submitted to · the trial 
Court which would in any way overcome the pre-
sumption existing in Respondent's favor that the 
testator knew the law and intended that should 
Wilhelmina predecease him that the bequest made 
under Paragraph 7 would immediately vest in A. C. 
W allich upon the death of Claudius W allich. 
While the testator, Claudius W allich could have 
anticipated the prior death of Wilhelmina, he made 
no provisions for such contingency. 
Also, while the Appellant has made absolutely 
no reference to the testimony of Fred W allich, ap-
pellant does state, "it would seem" which might in-
fer some attention should be given such testimony. 
First: There was no ambiguity in the Will and there-
fore any testimony attempting to vary the same was 
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inadmissable. Second: Fred W allich, being a party 
to these proceedings was incompetent to testify un-
der our statute known as the "Dead Man Statute." 
Counsel for appellant, on Page 12 of their brief, 
state that there is nothing in the will that would 
indicate any intention to provide more abundantly 
for Mr. A. C. W allich than any other relative. The 
short answer to this statement is that the Will plainly 
and specifically provides that A. C. Wallich is to 
receive $5,000.00, and in addition, the remainder of 
the property described in Paragraph 7. Bequests 
to relatives vary. For instance, the will itself shows 
that Christina Stephens, a niece, was given a bequest 
of $10,000.00 and under Paragraph 4 of the first codi-
cil to the will, dated April 10, 1952, this is raised 
to $15,000.00. 
The Court should bear in mind that the maximum 
term of the residuary trust of $150,000.00 is five 
years. Clearly Wilhelmina could have been amply 
supported out of the residuary trust and most cer-
tainly would have realized a substantial sum upon 
the residuary trust being distributed at the end of 
the five years. 
In conclusion we submit that the findings and 
judgment of the court are amply supported by the 
evidence and that the evidence shows that it was 
clearly the intention of the testator, Claudius W ai-
lich, in view of the Utah statute, that should Wilhel-
mina predecease him, A. C. Wallich should be, upon 
the death of Claudius Wallich, vested with the own-
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ership of the property described in Paragraph 7. 
We submit that the judgment of the trial Court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK, JOHNSON, 
SCHOENHALS, & ROBERTS 
Counsel for Respondent 
ARMSTRONG, HELM, 
MARSHALL, & SCHUMANN 
Ass,ociate Counsel 
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